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INTRODUCTION: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT JURISDICTION OVER THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court1 provides for the
inclusion of the crime of aggression within the Court’s jurisdiction,2 but the
Statute needs to be amended to include a deﬁnition of aggression as well as
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the International Criminal
Court.3 This contribution argues that the creation of the International
Criminal Court provides the international community with an historic
opportunity to establish effective jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
The debate about the deﬁnition of aggression involves a number of
important issues and perspectives: First, the criminal-justice perspective to
aggression (as embodied by the supporters of International Criminal Court
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression) has implications for the collective
security system (embodied by the United Nations Charter). Secondly, there
seems to be a latent tension between the idealism of international criminal law
and the realism of international politics. It is submitted that a constitutionalist
perspective on these developments might help to put the debate in its proper
context, namely an attempt to advance the common good of international
peace and security through multiple means, and on a rational footing.
* BA LLB LLM LLD (Stell) ILSC (Antwerp). This is a revised version of parts of
the author’s unpublished LLD thesis (University of Stellenbosch). The author would
like to thank his promoters, Professor M G Erasmus and Professor S E van der
Merwe, for their support and guidance.
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) UN Doc A/CONF
183/9, (1998) 37 ILM 999, referred to below as the ‘Rome Statute’.
2 Article 5(1).
3 Article 5(2).
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONALIST
PERSPECTIVE
Supporters of the International Criminal Court are often labelled ‘idealists’
because power ‘is wished away’ and too much conﬁdence is placed in legal
mechanisms to address massive human rights abuses and other atrocities. The
realist critique seems to be that legal mechanisms are employed by idealists to
resolve ‘essentially political problems’.4 There is arguably no international
law problem more political5 than the debate about whether, and if so, how to
provide for the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. This debate is about more than a legal-technical process to
deﬁne aggression — it concerns in essence a debate about the proper role of
international (criminal) law in the contemporary international system.
One way of looking at the system of international criminal law is to view it
as a reaction of the international community to atrocities.6 This must be seen
in context: States are (still) the primary actors in the international system, but
the constitutionalist notion of an international community (or, civitas
maxima)7 entails that this international community is governed by norms,
not power.8 It means that the international system (traditionally anarchist,
where states — in the absence of an overarching sovereign — acted in their
own interest and where the exercise of state power was central)9 is moving
towards the supra-national limitation of state power.10 The United Nations
4 Stephen D Krasner ‘Realist views of international law’ 2002 American Society of
International Law, Proceedings 267.
5 See for instance Marten Zwanenburg ‘The statute for an international criminal
court and the United States: Peacekeepers under ﬁre?’ (1999) 10 European Journal of
International Law 124 for an overview of some of the political and substantive con-
cerns regarding the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
6 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 3–14.
7 This concept of ‘international community’ can be traced to the publicist Chris-
tian Wolff (1749) who employed the notion of civitas maxima to demonstrate the
rule of law and communitarian attributes underlying the international community.
See further Anne Peters ‘There is nothing more practical than a good theory: An
overview of contemporary approaches to international law’ (2001) 44 German Year-
book of International Law 25 at 35.
8 See Wouter Werner ‘Constitutionalisation, fragmentation, politicization, the
constitutionalisation of international law as a Janus-faced phenomenon’ (2007) 8
Griffin’s View on International and Comparative Law 17 at 18–23.
9 David Caron pointed out that the condition of anarchy is (still) a basic feature of
international relations. David D Caron ‘Framing political theory of international
courts and tribunals: Reﬂections at the Centennial’ 2006 American Society of Interna-
tional Law, Proceedings 56.
10 Neo-Marxists would argue that the constitutionalization of international law is a
step in the direction of a new empire. See for instance Michael Hardt & Antonio
Negri Empire (2000) 9–10: ‘The transition we are witnessing today from traditional
international law, which was deﬁned by contracts and treaties, to the deﬁnition and
constitution of a new sovereign, supranational world power (and thus to an imperial
notion of right), however incomplete, gives us a framework in which to read the
totalizing social processes of Empire. In effect, the juridical transformation functions
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Charter has been described as a ‘constitutional’ limitation on the power of
sovereign states, thus regulating the exercise of state power, notably the use
of armed force by states. The International Criminal Court has also been
described as such a ‘constitutional’ development,11 albeit not limiting, but
rather complementing12 the exercise of national jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes under international law.13
The International Criminal Court is perhaps in a position to limit the
sovereignty of states party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court in the sense that it can inﬂuence state behaviour and policy, for
instance with respect to human rights practices.14 In this context the
international community should be viewed as more than a political
community; it is also a legal community. It is a community characterized by
norms such as the desire to act in the common good, and by actions to
advance the collective interest. This (essentially constitutionalist) view of the
international community also emphasizes the importance of certain funda-
mental values, especially ‘super-norms’ like jus cogens obligations — for
instance the prohibition of the use of force by states.15
THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL
ATROCITIES
The criminal-justice reaction to international atrocities (epitomized by the
establishment of international criminal tribunals)16 is prompted in part by the
failure of other measures (for instance diplomatic and economic sanctions) to
stop or prevent atrocities like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and indeed aggression. In terms of the criminal justice response, various
modalities exist to address the atrocities that affect the whole of humankind.
Antonio Cassese identiﬁed the following modalities: the exercise by national
as a symptom of the modiﬁcations of the material biopolitical constitution of our
societies. These changes regard not only international law and international relations
but also the internal power relations of each country. . .[In] Empire there is peace, in
Empire there is the guarantee of justice for all peoples.’
11 SeeWerner op cit note 8 at 27.
12 Under the principle of complementarity, the International Criminal Court will
only exercise jurisdiction over a matter if a state party is either unwilling or unable to
prosecute. For detailed analysis see in general Jann K Kleffner & Gerben Kor (eds)
Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdiction (2007).
13 War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The International Criminal
Court also has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but on condition that a
suitable deﬁnition and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction can be agreed upon
by the states parties to theRome Statute.
14 For more on this argument, see Gustavo Gallón ‘The International Criminal
Court and the challenge of deterrence’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) International Crimes,
Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court (2000) 93–104, in
particular at 103–4.
15 See in general Peters op cit note 7 at 35.
16 Including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
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courts of jurisdiction over offences on grounds of territoriality or nationality;
the exercise by national courts of extraterritorial jurisdiction (the latter
possibly being the result of obligations in terms of the aut dedere, aut
judicare17 enforcement model in international criminal law); the establish-
ment of truth commissions to complement traditional criminal-justice
responses to atrocities; and the establishment of international criminal
tribunals.18 An essential precondition for the functioning of the last-
mentioned modality is the notion of individual criminal liability for crimes
under international law.
The main purpose of traditional international law is the regulation of the
relations between states. The historic prosecution of individuals for crimes
under international law in the post-SecondWorldWar international criminal
tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo can be seen as the conﬁrmation of the
separateness of international criminal law from classic (public) international
law:19 individuals are the subjects20 of international criminal law, and
individuals can be held liable for crimes under international law.
The establishment of effective individual criminal liability for the crime of
aggression (indeed the genesis of the criminalization of aggression) proved to
be politically controversial legal processes.21
17 Many international instruments contain this model of enforcement of interna-
tional criminal law. It imposes on states parties the duty to either ‘extradite or pros-
ecute’ individuals responsible for crimes under international law. Hugo Grotius used
the term aut dedere aut punire, but this was in 1973 reformulated by Cherif Bassiouni
to ‘aut dedere aut judicare’, in order to emphasize the judicial process in the form of a
trial that is necessary to determine criminal culpability. See Cherif M Bassiouni Inter-
national Criminal Law 2 ed vol I (1999) 5.
18 Cassese op cit note 6 at 6–14.
19 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law (2001) 9. Lyal Sunga wrote
that the term international criminal law ‘is accurate only if used in any one of three
senses: 1) to refer to the accumulation of international legal norms on individual
criminal responsibility (without implying that they form a coherent system); 2) to
refer to international criminal law as an incipient ﬁeld of international law currently in
a stage of emergence (without implying that it already exists as a relatively self-
sufﬁcient or autonomous system); or 3) to refer to the decisions, law and procedure of
a permanent international criminal court’. See Lyal S Sunga The Emerging System of
International Criminal Law — Developments in Codification and Implementation (1997) 7.
In my view, international criminal law has (especially after the adoption of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998) indeed emerged as a separate
system in all three respects as identiﬁed by Sunga.
20 Cherif Bassiouni (ed) The Protection of Human Rights in the Administration of Crimi-
nal Justice (1994) xxiv; GerhardWerle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 35.
21 On the historic criminalization of aggression (‘crimes against peace’), see Telford
Taylor ‘The Nuremberg trials’ (1955) 55 Columbia LR 488; Franz B Schick ‘Crimes
against peace’ (1948) 38 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 445; JonathanABush
‘ ‘‘The Supreme . . . Crime’’ and its origins: The lost legislative history of the crime of
aggressive war’ (2002) 102 Columbia LR 2324.
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THE CRIMINALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION
The customary-law status of aggression as a crime under international law (at
least as it pertains to wars of aggression) is regarded by prominent publicists to
be quite well-established.22 This status of the crime of aggression has its roots
in the post-SecondWorldWar international criminal tribunals at Nuremberg
and Tokyo. Neither of the statutes that established the historic post-war
international criminal tribunals deﬁned aggression.23 However, looking at
the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments, one can say that both the political and
legal conditions were optimum for their success in convicting individuals for
the crime of aggression (in the form of ‘crimes against the peace’).24 It is
certainly possible to criticize the Nuremberg and Tokyo processes as having
been ‘victors’ justice’— and the dogmatic and jurisprudential critique against
the ex post facto criminalization of aggression at Nuremberg is well-
known.25 What is important, however, is that the processes at Nuremberg
(and later Tokyo) were, everything considered, successful in ensuring that
peace was established, not through political convenience, but at least with
the help of a judicial process. These ad hoc tribunals represented important
milestones on the long road to end impunity for crimes of international
concern. For instance, the Nuremberg Principles26 (adopted in 1950), were,
generally speaking, more than just an attempt to preserve the jurisprudential
legacy of Nuremberg.27 In many ways the work of the International Law
Commission in this regard served as an impetus to keep many of the ideals of
international criminal law alive — the most important of which was the ideal
of a permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over the core
international crimes.28
Since the post-Second World War trials in Germany and Japan, there has
been no prosecution of an individual for this supreme international crime.
This state of affairs prevails despite the fact that aggression is regarded as a
22 Werle op cit note 20 at 390–1; Cassese op cit note 6 at 112–13.
23 See the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1945) UN
Treaty Series, vol 82, 279; and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East at Tokyo (1946) Special Proc by the Supreme Commander for theAllied
Powers, as amended 26April 1946, TIASNo 1589.
24 For an analysis of this crime, see Leo Gross ‘The criminality of aggressive war’
(1947) 41 The American Political Science Review 205.
25 For more on this, see Hans Leonhardt ‘The Nuremberg trial: A legal analysis’
(1949) 11 The Review of Politics 449.
26 Nuremberg Principles, Geneva, 19 Jul 1950, UNGAOR, 5th Session, Supp No
12, UN DocA/1316 (1950), reproduced in Christine van denWyngaert (ed) Interna-
tional Criminal Law: A Collection of European and International Instruments (2005) 319–
20.
27 For a discussion of the impact of the Nuremberg Principles in various domestic
legal contexts, see Gary Komarow ‘Individual responsibility under international law:
The Nuremberg Principles in domestic legal systems’ (1980) 29 International & Com-
parative LQ 21.
28 See Sir Arthur Watts The International Law Commission 1949–1998 vol III (1999)
1658.
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crime under customary international law, as indicated above. There are also a
number of states that criminalize aggression (in some or other form) under
their domestic law.29
The absence of prosecutions of individuals for the crime of aggression was
not due to a lack of wars (civil or international) in the decades following the
Second World War. Indeed, even the period of the Cold War was
characterized by conﬂicts and the use of armed force by states, often in prima
facie contravention of the prohibition of the use of force provided for in the
United Nations Charter.30 The lack of prosecutions should not be seen as a
reﬂection on the normative legacy of Nuremberg. This legacy provided the
legal and normative context of many attempts to build on the jurisprudence
of Nuremberg (and Tokyo). These attempts were primarily aimed at keeping
alive the ideal of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over the
most serious crimes under international law, notably aggression, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. The United Nations and the
International Law Commission, as well as numerous specialist organizations,
scholars and human rights organizations, worked on various proposals to
create a permanent international criminal court, and to deﬁne or codify the
most serious crimes. Some early successes, like the adoption of the Genocide
Convention of 1948,31 provided hope that the ‘legacy of Nuremberg’ (in the
sense that individuals responsible for the worst international crimes should
not go unpunished) would live on. The General Assembly of the United
Nations — arguably the entity which is most representative of the
‘international community’ — adopted the Nuremberg Principles in 1950.32
These Principles conﬁrmed the notion of individual criminal liability for the
most serious crimes under international law, and in particular the crimes tried
at Nuremberg (crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
29 For instance Germany. The Code of Crimes against International Law of 2002
(Völkerstrafgesetzbuch — VStGB) provides for the incorporation of international
crimes into German criminal law. The VStGB does not include the crime of aggres-
sion, which is understandable, since the VStGB is aimed at bringing German criminal
law in line with the Rome Statute (which does not yet provide for a deﬁnition of
aggression). However, s 80 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch — StGB)
provides for the crime of ‘preparation of aggressive war’. This crime is subject to
extraterritorial jurisdiction. If the act of preparation of aggressive war (within the
meaning of s 80 StGB) occurred in a foreign state, German courts would be able to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime. See in general Helmut Satzger
‘German criminal law and theRome Statute—Acritical analysis of theNewGerman
Code of Crimes against International Law’ (2002) 2 International Criminal LR 261–82;
Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhütte in Burkhard Jähnke, Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhütte &
Walter Odersky Strafgesetzbuch — Leipziger Kommentar 4 ed (2005) 1–30.
30 For instance the Iran/Iraq war during the 1980s and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979.
31 Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide
(1948) UN Treaty Series vol 78, 227.
32 Nuremberg Principles, 29 July 1950, UNGAOR 5th Session, Supp No 12, UN
DocA/1316 (1950), reproduced inVan denWyngaert op cit note 26 at 319.
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humanity). The Genocide Convention, the Nuremberg Principles, and the
four Geneva Conventions adopted in 1949,33 indicated that the international
community wanted to keep the legacy of Nuremberg alive, and to expand
the scope of individual criminal liability for international crimes.
Aggression proved to be the most contentious of the four ‘core crimes’,
referred to above. While the United Nations Charter reﬂected (especially in
art 2(4)) the commitment of the international community to end the use of
force by states as a means to settle disputes or to further the national interest,
neither this charter nor any other international legal instrument provided for
a deﬁnition of aggression. It was only in 1974 that the United Nations
General Assembly adopted a so-called ‘consensus’ deﬁnition of aggression,34
but this text was drafted with state responsibility (and not individual criminal
liability) in mind.35
From the early 1950s to 1996 the International Law Commission
attempted to deﬁne aggression for purposes of individual criminal liability,
but these attempts proved to be unsuccessful.36
The end of the ColdWar did not result in global peace, but it provided the
international community with an opportunity to react more decisively (and
beyond the political restrictions of the Cold War) to threats to international
peace and security. The establishment, in the last decade of the twentieth
century, of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals by the Security
Council to deal with massive human rights violations in the Former
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda provided the essential political and legal impetus
for the formation of a permanent international criminal court.37 The fusion
33 Convention for theAmelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I) (1949) UN Treaty Series, vol 75,
31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II) (1949) UN
Treaty Series, vol 75, 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Geneva Convention III) (1949) UN Treaty Series, vol 75, 135; Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV)
(1949) UNTreaty Series, vol 75, 287.
34 Deﬁnition of Aggression, GA Res 3314 (xxix), 29 UN GAOR Supp No 31,
142UNDocA/9631 (1974), reproduced inVan denWyngaert op cit note 26 at 357.
35 For a critical assessment, see Julius Stone ‘Hopes and loopholes in the 1974
deﬁnition of aggression’ (1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 224. On the
usefulness of the deﬁnition from an international criminal-law perspective, see Justin
Hogan-Doran & Bibi T van Ginkel ‘Aggression as a crime under international law
and the prosecution of individuals by the proposed International Criminal Court’
(1996) 43 Netherlands International LR 321, in particular at 336.
36 See in general Timothy LH McCormack & Gerry J Simpson ‘The International
Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind:
An appraisal of the substantive provisions’ (1994) 5 Criminal Law Forum 1; John
Murphy ‘Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes’ (1993) 11 Nouvelles Études
Pénales 209 (excerpts reprinted in Cherif Bassiouni International Criminal Law 2 ed vol
I (1999) 338–40).
37 Bruce Broomhall International Justice and the International Criminal Court —
Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (2003) 9–10.
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of political and criminal-justice responses to mass atrocities that shocked the
conscience of the world and threatened international peace and security,
provided a paradigm conducive to a more effective approach to the core
crimes under international law. In this spirit the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court was adopted in July 1998, signalling a hopeful
end to a bloody century.
The Rome Statute establishes a permanent International Criminal Court
to try individuals responsible for the most serious crimes under international
law, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This statute
also includes aggression as a crime within the court’s jurisdiction, but the
International Criminal Court can only exercise jurisdiction over the crime
after the adoption of a deﬁnition and conditions for the exercise of
jurisdiction. The ‘supreme international crime’ proved too contentious for
direct and immediate inclusion in the Rome Statute. Article 5(2) of the
Rome Statute provides as follows:
‘The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 deﬁning the crime
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction
with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant
provisions of the United Nations.’
The historic criminalization of aggression occurred in the aftermath of the
Second World War and in the context of the international community’s
efforts to outlaw the use of force by states. The development of the jus ad
bellum — today best described as the jus contra bellum38 — represents one
of the salient features of the international political and legal system. The
prohibition of the use of force by states is one of the highest norms of the
international legal system.39 This system, of which collective security40 forms
a key characteristic, provides the institutional context for the continuing
debates surrounding the various efforts to build on the post-Second World
War prosecutions of individuals for the crime of aggression. The various
efforts to deﬁne and codify the crime of aggression for purposes of individual
criminal liability are fundamentally informed by the historical, institutional
and normative factors referred to above.
The historical attempts to deﬁne and codify the crime of aggression are
also analysed in the context of the evolving system of international criminal
law. This system is characterized by national and international efforts to end
38 On the development of the jus contra bellum (and its relevance for contempo-
rary international law) see Johan van der Vyver ‘Ius contra bellum andAmerican foreign
policy’ (2003) 28 South African Yearbook of Intenational Law 1.
39 See in general George Barrie ‘Forcible intervention and international law: Legal
theory and realities’ (1999) 116 SALJ 791;Alexander Orakhelashvili Peremptory Norms
in International Law (2006) 50–1.
40 In the collective security context an important fusion of politics and law can be
seen. It is simply not possible to draw clear lines between ‘political’ and ‘legal’
responses to threats to international peace and security. See Erika de Wet The Chapter
VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004) 133–5.
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impunity for the worst crimes affecting the international community as a
whole, notably the core crimes. This evolving system comprises efforts to
establish national criminal jurisdiction over the core crimes. In order to
complement this, states party to the permanent International Criminal Court
are obliged to provide for the necessary domestic legal mechanisms that
would make it possible for such states effectively to co-operate with the
International Criminal Court. To this end, the complementary jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court ensures that, where a state party to the
Rome Statute is either unwilling or unable to prosecute an individual or
individuals responsible for one or more of the crimes within the court’s
jurisdiction, the International Criminal Court can try the case.41
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF AGGRESSION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
State sovereignty (states exercising exclusive power over their territories) has
been the organizing principle of the modern international political and legal
system since at least the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 (in terms of the Treaties
of Osnabrück and Münster).42 These treaties, which ended the Thirty Years’
War between Sweden, France and Germany, not only conﬁrmed the
concept of sovereign states as the organizing principle of the international
system, but also provided for the enforcement of the peace treaties. Leo
Gross has pointed out that Europe therefore received ‘an international
constitution, which gave to all its adherents the right of intervention to
enforce its engagements’.43 Thus, the treaties were more than mere
conﬁrmations of state sovereignty, or of peace between two or more
sovereign states: the treaties came to represent the ﬁrst attempt to create a
‘constitutional’ order in an international system dominated by sovereign
states. In this sense, the Peace of Westphalia can be considered as an
important precursor44 to the international system of sovereign states,
governed by the principles of collective security contained in the Charter of
the United Nations.
The Charter of the United Nations provides that this organization ‘is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’.45 This
principle forms the basis of modern public international law and is also ‘the
fundamental premise on which all international relations rest.’46 The United
Nations Charter conﬁrms the Westphalian notion of sovereignty as a
41 See para 10 of the Preamble, and art 17 of the Rome Statute. See further Sharon
Williams ‘Issues of admissibility’ in Otto Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court (1999) 383–94; Kleffner &Kor op cit note 12.
42 For an historical overview, see Leo Gross ‘The Peace ofWestphalia, 1648–1948’
(1948) 42 American Journal of International Law 20.
43 Ibid at 24.
44 Ibid at 20.
45 Charter of theUnitedNations, art 2(1).
46 Antonio Cassese International Law 2 ed (2005) 48.
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foundation of the international system, and protects the legal equality
between states.47 The principle of non-intervention and the prohibition of
the threat or use of force are two features of the international system that are
closely associated with the concept of sovereignty. These notions, however,
are not static. The dynamics of collective security, the constitutionalization
of the international system, and the normative impact of human rights are
some of the factors that shape the content and scope of ‘state sovereignty’,
‘non-intervention’, and the ‘prohibition of the threat or use of force’.
‘Sovereignty’, ‘territorial integrity’, and ‘political independence’ of states are
also protected interests in the context of the criminalization of international
aggression.48
Although the ‘sovereign equality of states’ can be regarded as the raison
d’être of the present international system, the normative impact of human
rights and the evolving system of international criminal law are changing the
meaning and scope of ‘sovereignty’. The recognition of the notion of
individual criminal liability for crimes under international law, and the
creation of international criminal tribunals to try individuals responsible for
these crimes, marked a fundamental departure from the traditional (West-
phalian) notion of sovereignty. Bruce Broomhall has put it as follows:
‘The idea that sovereignty does not arise in a vacuum, but is constituted by the
recognition of the international community, which makes its recognition
conditional on certain standards, has become increasingly accepted in the ﬁelds
of international law and international relations. Such limits are held always to
have been imposed by the community on the recognition of its members, but
to be subject to development over time. From this perspective, crimes under
international law can be understood as a formal limit to a State’s legitimate
exercise of its sovereignty, and so in principle justify a range of international
responses (subject to the rest of international law, including that relating to the
use of force).’49
It is submitted that the constitutionalization of the international system
and the system of collective security, as well as the evolving legal and political
processes within this paradigm, are important for the development of an
effective dispensation regarding the question of individual criminal liability
for aggression. The interrelationship between the principal organs of the
collective security system and the institutions and processes of the evolving
system of international criminal law, is of fundamental importance to this
issue.
DEFINING AGGRESSION
Historically, different schools of thought on the possibility and desirability of
deﬁning aggression (for purposes of individual criminal liability) can be
47 Ibid.
48 See for instance Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind (1991), art 15(2), and United Nations General Assembly Deﬁnition of Aggres-
sion (1974), art 1.
49 Broomhall op cit note 37 at 43.
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identiﬁed. Julius Stone, one of the prominent exponents of the ‘sceptical
school’, supported the criticism that a deﬁnition would provide a ‘trap for
the innocent and a signpost for the guilty’.50 This school of thought opposed
attempts to deﬁne aggression, regardless of whether a ‘general deﬁnition’
approach or ‘enumerative’ approach was taken. These sceptical voices were
also informed by a desire not to restrict the functions of international bodies
(notably the Security Council) in determining or identifying the occurrence
of aggression.51 Ian Brownlie, a proponent of attempts to deﬁne aggression,
stated the following about the requirements for a deﬁnition of aggression:
‘Deﬁnition must involve generalization and employ elements which require
further deﬁnition. It may also be said that no deﬁnition is ‘‘automatic’’, since
the organ concerned must necessarily apply any criteria to particular facts.
Particularly dubious is the argument that a criminal may take advantage of a
precise deﬁnition; one might assume instead that he would welcome the
absence of a deﬁnition.’52
The problem, according to Brownlie, was that since the Nuremberg trials
and the creation of the new United Nations-dominated collective security
system, ‘the quest for a deﬁnition of aggression’ became a ‘vast law-making
project with many facets’.53 From being originally a military concept, it
became much more of a legal concept after the First World War. While the
Nuremberg Tribunal (and certainly the subsequent proceedings in occupied
Germany) interpreted and applied aggression rather narrowly (concentrating
on ‘waging a war of aggression’),54 the attempts to deﬁne aggression in the
post-Second World War era concerned a number of state policies that might
have an impact on the interests of other states — thus making the
‘law-making project’ much more comprehensive, but less focused and
certainly, in the end, less successful.55 The concept of aggression was no
longer limited to the use of armed force, but concepts like ‘economic
aggression’56 and ‘indirect aggression’ (states acting vicariously)57 were also
entertained and played a role in the different drafting processes and debates
on a suitable deﬁnition for aggression.
50 Julius Stone (1958) as quoted in Ian Brownlie International Law and the Use of
Force by States (1963) 355. Echoes of this scepticism can also be found in the debate
about American opposition to the International Criminal Court, particularly in the
context of the process of drafting a deﬁnition for the crime of aggression. For some of
these arguments, see W Nash ‘The ICC and the deployment of US armed forces’ in
Sarah B Sewall & Carl Kaysen The United States and the International Criminal Court
(2000) 153–64.
51 Brownlie op cit note 50 at 355.
52 Ibid at 356.
53 Ibid.
54 InternationalMilitaryTribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment (1946) IMT171 at 186.
55 Brownlie op cit note 50 at 356.
56 Stone op cit note 35 at 230–1.
57 Stone op cit note 35 at 237–9.
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ANOTHER STEP IN THE ‘VAST LAW-MAKING PROJECT’: THE
ROME STATUTE AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Not all the delegates to the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the
establishment of an International Criminal Court were in favour of the
inclusion of aggression as a crime within the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court. Many delegates regarded the crime of aggression as
essentially a crime committed by states, not individuals. Other delegates
regarded aggression as too ‘political’ a concept, not susceptible to legal
deﬁnition. Some delegates were also concerned that the paramount role of
the Security Council in matters of international peace and security would be
eroded by the inclusion of aggression in the Rome Statute.58
At the Rome Conference two opposing views emerged on the inclusion
of the crime of aggression in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
These two blocs were much more intransigent in their respective points of
view than the delegations at the meetings that preceded the Rome
Conference. On the role of the Security Council, many states, but especially
those from the Non-Alignment Movement, wanted an absolutely indepen-
dent court with no role for the Security Council. This included no role for
the Security Council regarding the crime of aggression. Directly in
opposition to this were many western states and Russia who wanted a central
role for the Security Council. Indeed, the permanent members of the
Security Council persisted in their view that the role of the Security Council
is an absolute condition for the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the
Statute.59
The present art 5(2) of the Rome Statute is a reﬂection of the proposal by
the Non-Alignment Movement, but there is also an important nod in the
direction of those states who favour a role for the Security Council in cases of
aggression.Article 5(2) provides that any future deﬁnition of aggression ‘shall
be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations’. Some commentators see this as an indication that the language of
art 5(2) provides for some threshold of Security Council involvement.60
The ﬁnal text of the Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted
at Rome reﬂects a compromise between the delegations opposed to and
those in favour of the inclusion of aggression. It also reﬂects some of the
concerns of many of the delegations regarding the conditions under which
the International Criminal Court should exercise its jurisdiction, as well as
58 See in general ‘Summary Records of the 1998 Diplomatic Conference’ in
Cherif Bassiouni The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court vol 3 (2005)
127–382.
59 Roy S K Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court — The Making of the Rome
Statute (1999) 84.
60 D Sarooshi ‘Aspects of the relationship between the International Criminal
Court and the United Nations’ (2001) 32 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 27
at 43–4; Daryl AMundis ‘The Assembly of States Parties and the institutional frame-
work of the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International
Law 132.
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the role of the Security Council in terms of its Chapter VII powers (to
maintain international peace and security).
In Michael Reisman’s opinion the Security Council is assigned the task of
restoring and maintaining peace and order and this necessarily imports a
‘broad competence to engage in a contextual appreciation of whether to
characterize certain uses of force as aggression’.61 On the other hand,
according to Reisman, a criminal-law approach ‘is not charged with world
order concerns and does not admit a comparable contextual appreciation’.62
In my view, the political approach (that is basically the collective-security
approach, dominated by the Security Council) differs in substance, method-
ology and outcome from the criminal-justice response to international
aggression. The question is whether these approaches can co-exist (or even
complement each other) within a single deﬁnition and enforcement
mechanism for the crime of aggression under the Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
Indeed, art 5(2) of the Rome Statute reﬂects a compromise reached at the
Diplomatic Conference in 1998. Underlying art 5(2) is the tension between
the political and criminal-justice approaches. The deﬁnition of aggression in
the strict sense (the elements of the crime) and the issue of the relationship
between the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the crime
of aggression and the powers of the Security Council stemming from art 39
of the United Nations Charter, are all interdependent.63
THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION
A review conference on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court is due to be held in 2009 or 2010. This event will present theAssembly
of States Parties with the opportunity to amend the Rome Statute, including
any progress made on the deﬁnition of aggression and the conditions under
which the International Criminal Court could exercise its jurisdiction with
respect to aggression, as prompted by art 5(2) of the Rome Statute.
It is the task of the special working group to discuss proposals for a
provision on aggression. These discussions have already produced many
discussion documents with different options and models on both the
deﬁnition of aggression and the conditions of exercising of jurisdiction by
the International Criminal Court.64
61 W Michael Reisman ‘Introduction: The deﬁnition of aggression and the ICC’
2002 American Society of Iinternational Law, Proceedings 181.
62 Ibid.
63 See further Phani Dascalopoulou-Livada ‘The crime of aggression: Making
operative the jurisdiction of the ICC — Tendencies in the PrepCom’ 2002 American
Society of International Law, Proceedings 185.
64 For background see ‘Press conference by chairman of working group on crime
of aggression’ 31 Jan 2007 (available at www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/
070131_Wenaweser.doc.htm).
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(a) Aggression as a ‘leadership crime’
The ongoing technical and diplomatic processes to ﬁnd a suitable deﬁnition
of aggression for purposes of inclusion in the Rome Statute require a critical
and prognostic approach in terms of the various reports of the Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute. The approach with the broadest support
thus far seems to be the so-called ‘differentiated approach’ to the deﬁnition of
aggression. In terms of the conduct of the individual, this approach provides
for direct perpetration, co-perpetration and perpetration by means. In
addition, it provides for the criminal responsibility of individuals who order,
solicit, or induce the crime of aggression (whether it occurs in fact or is
attempted). The forms of criminal responsibility that emanate from art
25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute are quite distinct. The ﬁrst form of
responsibility in this context is for a perpetrator by means. As Kai Ambos
noted, ‘[a] person who orders a crime is not a mere accomplice but rather a
perpetrator by means, using a subordinate to commit the crime.’65 In this
sense art 25(3)(b) actually complements art 28 of the Rome Statute, which
provides for command responsibility. However, in the case of aggression, the
preferred approach seems to be that art 28 (responsibility of commanders and
other superiors) should not apply. This makes sense, because the nature of the
crime of aggression is such that it is really inconceivable that members of the
military (who are normally not in a position to direct the political or military
apparatus of the state) can commit the crime of aggression, for which their
superiors will then (on the basis of art 28) be held responsible.66
The preferred variant of the deﬁnition of aggression further provides for
responsibility on the basis of aiding, abetting and assistance. In the context of
aggression, the meaning and application of the words ‘providing the means
for its commission’ (as per art 25(3)(c)) could have far-reaching consequences
for individuals who are not necessarily political or military leaders. In this
regard the historical examples of the so-called Nuremberg industrialists’
65 Kai Ambos ‘Individual criminal responsibility’ in Otto Triffterer (ed) Commen-
tary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) 480. See further
Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96–4-T, 2 Sept 1998, para 483: ‘By
ordering the commission of one of the crimes . . . a person also incurs individual
criminal responsibility. Ordering implies a superior-subordinate relationship between
the person giving the order and the one executing it. In other words, the person in a
position of authority uses it to convince another to commit an offence. In certain
legal systems, including that of Rwanda, ordering is a form of complicity through
instructions given to the direct perpetrator of an offence. Regarding the position of
authority, the Chamber considers that sometimes it can be just a question of fact.’ For
further comment on this case, see William Schabas in André Klip & Göran Sluiter
(eds) Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals Student Ed (2005) 427–
42.
66 Despite wide agreement in the special working group that art 28 should not
apply to the crime of aggression, there was disagreement on whether the non-
applicability needs to be speciﬁed or not. See Assembly of States Parties, Resumed
Fifth Session, Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression proposed by the Chair-
man (16 Jan 2007),Annex, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2 (available at www.icc-cpi.int/asp).
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prosecutions67 could hold lessons for the criminal liability of individuals for
the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute. Although the prosecutions
of a number of rich industrialists sympathetic to the Nazi regime’s aggressive
foreign policy were not successful as far as the charges relating to aggression
were concerned, the implications for possible future prosecutions of
individuals who made an aggressive war effort possible (through resources or
other forms of assistance) should be considered. Allison Marston Danner
noted the following:
‘International prosecutors contemplating bringing charges of aggression against
corporate ofﬁcers will have to consider the Nuremberg precedents carefully.
They must assess whether the political climate and legal understanding of
aggression has changed sufﬁciently in the past sixty years to garner a different
result than that recorded in the earlier cases.’68
The subjective element contained in art 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute —
‘for the purpose of facilitating’— means that the accomplice (the individual
aiding or abetting) must have special knowledge about the circumstances in
which the assistance is taking place. This formulation goes further than the
mens rea requirement in terms of art 30 of the Rome Statute. Indeed, this
seems to be a ‘speciﬁc subjective requirement stricter than mere knowl-
edge’.69 The notion than an individual should be held liable for his or her
contribution to the criminal conduct lies at the heart of the general principles
of individual criminal responsibility as provided for in art 25 of the Rome
Statute. In my view, the emphasis on aggression as a ‘leadership crime’ best
reﬂects the historical legacies of Nuremberg and Tokyo. However, it is
prudent to note that ‘leadership’ is often a complex notion. Thus it is
submitted that the criminalization of forms of criminal liability such as
incitement or common purpose (as per art 25(3) of the Rome Statute) best
reﬂects the complexities of leadership and the structures that often make
leadership (and decision-making) effective. Viewed from the constitutional-
ist perspective, one can see how the criminalization of the decision to go to
war (and possibly the policy-making that preceded it) represents a limitation
on sovereignty. More than a general international-law limitation (notably in
terms of the United Nations Charter regime) on the ‘sovereign power of the
state’70 to go to war, the criminalization of aggressive war provides a further
limitation (a chilling effect) on the policy decisions of the leadership of the
sovereign state.
67 For a discussion of the implications of these post-second World War prosecu-
tions, see Allison Marston Danner ‘The Nuremberg industrialist prosecutions and
aggressive war’ (2006) 46 Virginia Journal of International Law 651.
68 Ibid at 676.
69 Ambos op cit note 65 at 483.
70 The classical proponents of the ‘just war’ theory argued that ‘[monarchs] and
those who command the sovereign power of the state are assigned exclusive responsi-
bility for recourse to aggressive war, that is, for matters of jus ad bellum, whereas the
responsibility of soldiers is limited to the use of proper methods of ﬁghting and other
issues of jus in bello’. See DavidRodin War & Self-Defense (2003) 167.
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(b) The act of aggression and the conduct of the state
The proposed art 8bis to be included in the Rome Statute provides not only
for the conduct and liability of the individual, but also for the required state
conduct.71 The report of the special working group on the crime of
aggression noted that ‘broad support’ was expressed for the term ‘act of
aggression’. This term is also used in art 39 of the United Nations Charter
and was furthermore elaborated on in the General Assembly deﬁnition of
aggression of 1974.72 The special working group regarded the use of the term
‘act of aggression’ as a well-established term (with some Security Council
resolutions73 on ‘acts of aggression’ to help guide interpretation in this
regard).
It was noted in the report of the special working group that, although the
term ‘armed attack’was linked to the concept of self-defence under art 51 of
the United Nations Charter, it lacked a speciﬁc deﬁnition. It was not deﬁned
in the Charter or in other international instruments.74 There is also a
difference in wording between art 2(4) and art 51 of the Charter. While the
latter refers to ‘armed attack’, art 2(4) refers to the broader concept of ‘threat
or use of force’. The conceptual differences ledAlbrecht Randelzhofer to the
following conclusion:
‘[Any] state affected by another state’s unlawful use of force not reaching the
threshold of an ‘armed attack’, is bound, if not exactly to endure the violation,
then at least to respond only by means falling short of the use or threat of force,
which are thus often totally ineffective. This at ﬁrst sight unacceptable result is
undoubtedly intended by the Charter, since the unilateral use of force is meant
to be excluded as far as possible. Until an armed attack occurs, states are
expected to renounce forcible self-defence . . . Only if and when the
prohibited use of force rises to an armed attack can the state concerned resort to
forcible measures for its defence.’75
The difference between the two notions does make sense in terms of the
general aim of the United Nations Charter to discourage the use of force by
states. In terms of the criminalization of aggression, the view was expressed
in the special working group that ‘the notion of ‘‘armed attack’’ should be
retained as it reﬂected the idea that only [the] gravest violations of the United
71 Paras 1 and 2 of the special working group’s proposed art 8bis.
72 Art 3 of the General Assembly Deﬁnition of Aggression. Art 4 provides that the
acts listed in art 3 ‘are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that
other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter’.
73 Resolutions like these can be regarded as evidence of the international commu-
nity’s views on state action that amounts to ‘acts of aggression’. See for instance UN
SC Res 387 of 31 Mar 1976, Res 577 of 6 Dec 1985 (‘acts of aggression’ by South
Africa againstAngola); UN SCRes 527 of 15Dec 1982 (‘premeditated aggressive act’
by SouthAfrica against Lesotho); UN SC Res 568 of 21 Jun 1985 (‘acts of aggression’
by SouthAfrica against Botswana).
74 Report of the SpecialWorking Group para 14.
75 Albrecht Randelzhofer ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds) The Charter of the
United Nations — A Commentary 2 ed vol I (2002) 790.
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Nations Charter are covered by the crime of aggression’.76 This view is also
consistent with the commentary of the International Law Commission77 on
art 16 of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of
Mankind.78 The conduct of the state will thus have to be of a serious nature.
This could be a violation of art 2(4) of the United Nations Charter or
conduct that constitutes ‘a sufﬁciently serious violation of an international
obligation’.79
The report of the special working group reﬂects the general view that the
conduct of the state will in essence be ‘the use of armed force’80 and will in all
probability be an act listed in art 3 of the General Assembly deﬁnition of
aggression of 1974. That list is not exhaustive and ‘the Security Council may
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the
Charter.’81
The nature or object and the result of the act of the state were further
contentious issues that the special working group had to consider. These
issues essentially concern the nature of the act of aggression or the armed
attack (in terms of the proposed art 8bis para 1 to be included in the Rome
Statute). There seemed to be broad support for a threshold provision that
refers to the ‘manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’. This
threshold should also be linked with the well-established notion of a ‘war of
aggression’, which was the term used by the Nuremberg Tribunal.82 The
supporters of this ‘threshold of seriousness’ wanted to exclude ‘borderline’
cases from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.83
Article 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also
makes reference to the inherent limitation of the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court to ‘the most serious crimes of international
concern’. It is submitted that the threshold contained in the above-
mentioned proposal before the special working group on the crime of
aggression, provides an important context and should be retained since it is
consistent with the nature of the crime of aggression as a crime against the
peace and security of mankind. The jurisdictional threshold provided for in
the Rome Statute must be seen in the context of the collective security
framework of the United Nations Charter. This would provide the proper
threshold to determine whether state conduct is serious enough to be
76 Report of the SpecialWorking Group para 15.
77 Watts op cit note 28 at 1739; Sunga op cit note 19 at 13–14.
78 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 5 Jul 1996,
Yearbook of the ILC 1996 vol II (2), reprinted in Van den Wyngaert op cit note 26 at
331.
79 Watts op cit note 28 at 1739.
80 See art 1 of theUNGeneralAssembly Deﬁnition ofAggression (1974).
81 Art 4 of theUNGeneralAssembly Deﬁnition ofAggression (1974).
82 Nuremberg Judgment supra note 54 (counts one and two on the war of aggres-
sion).
83 Report of the SpecialWorking Group para 16.
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regarded as an act of aggression. Apart from this, one should also be mindful
of the envisaged role of the Security Council, which is considered below.
(c) Conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court:
The role of the Security Council
The Report of the special working group on the crime of aggression noted
the following:
‘Divergent views were expressed as to whether the exercise of jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression should require a prior determination of the State act of
aggression by the Security Council, and on the consequences of the absence of
such determination. A view was expressed that in either case the [International
Criminal Court] would beneﬁt from the authority of the Security Council as
there would be political backing for the Court’s investigation of situations.’84
Paragraph 4 of the special working group’s proposed deﬁnition (art 8bis)
provides for Security Council involvement in cases of aggression before the
International Criminal Court. The text of the proposed para 4 reﬂects the
ﬁne balance between an independent International Criminal Court and the
traditional role of the Security Council in matters concerning international
peace and security. According to this proposal, before the prosecutor can
proceed with an investigation into a possible case of aggression, ‘the Court
shall ﬁrst ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination
of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned.’ If such a
determination exists, the International Criminal Court ‘shall notify the
Security Council of the situation before the Court’.
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute might provide a procedural avenue for
Security Council determinations of state acts of aggression, thus playing a
role in the process of International Criminal Court jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. Article 13 provides as follows:
‘The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
(a) a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance
with article 14;85
(b) a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(c) the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in
accordance with article 15.’
84 Report of the SpecialWorking Group para 23.
85 Article 14 provides as follows: ‘1. A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a
situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to
have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the
purpose of determining whether one or more speciﬁc persons should be charged with
the commission of such crimes. 2.As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant
circumstances and be accompanied by such supporting documentation as is available
to the State referring the situation.’
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The fact that a referral of a situation by the Security Council is one of the
so-called ‘trigger mechanisms’ of the International Criminal Court, must be
seen in context. Where cases are referred to the prosecutor in terms of art
13(a) or where the prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu in
terms of art 13(c), state acceptance is a precondition for the exercise of
jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court.86 The trigger mechanism
provided for in art 13(b) was one of the controversial issues before and
during the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the International Criminal
Court in 1998. While the majority of delegations were in favour of a referral
role for the Security Council, there was a small minority of delegations
which argued that this holds the potential for political abuse. In particular,
these delegations were worried that the permanent ﬁve members of the
Security Council could use their veto to stop referrals of situations where
they, their allies or their interests were involved or affected.87 These concerns
were ultimately rejected in favour of the inclusion of the present art 13(b).
The independence of the International Criminal Court is of paramount
importance. Too many layers of conditions for the exercise of its jurisdiction
will probably undermine the International Criminal Court’s independence
(and effectiveness). However, a clear role for the Security Council should be
accepted as one of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. More to the
point: the Security Council has an important political role to play — also
where aggression is concerned. It is the responsibility of the Security Council
to maintain international peace and security. At the same time the
independent role of the International Criminal Court (which is not an organ
of the United Nations) as the primary criminal-justice response to
international atrocities must be respected and encouraged. Any proposal that
a prior determination of aggression by the Security Council must be a
prerequisite to the International Criminal Court’s hearing of the case cannot
be supported. There needs to be a balance between an independent
International Criminal Court and the role of the Security Council in
international affairs.
The mechanism provided for in art 16 of the Rome Statute is an
important nod in the direction of the political structures of the international
system. Under art 16, the Security Council can request the International
Criminal Court to defer a case, on the basis that the trial is, for instance,
hampering efforts to restore international peace after the outbreak of
hostilities. This political check on the criminal-justice process is a reﬂection
of the important theme of collective security in international affairs. No
criminal-justice response to aggression can proceed without acknowledging
the role of the institutions of collective security. At the same time, the
prosecutor must be in a position to determine (independently) whether there
86 See also art 12(2) of theRome Statute.
87 See in general Sharon Williams ‘Article 13 — Exercise of jurisdiction’ in Otto
Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999)
349.
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is enough evidence to proceed with a case against an individual. The
prosecutor must be in a position to make up his own mind. The political
processes and decisions of the Security Council should not serve as absolute
jurisdictional facts on which the prosecutor must rely. Establishing an
independent role for the prosecutor is not in conﬂict with art 5(2) of the
Rome Statute. This article provides that any future provision on the crime of
aggression ‘shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations’. The fact that the International Criminal Court may
defer cases on request of the Security Council (in the context of Security
Council action on matters concerning international peace and security) is
evidence of the Court’s role as promoter of not only international justice but
also of international peace and security, in line with the aims of the United
Nations Charter.
There is no contradiction in providing for a political role for the Security
Council (and other organs of the United Nations), while insisting on an
independent criminal-justice response to aggression. Both strategies repre-
sent important goals of the twentieth century: collective security and the
evolving system of international criminal law as a quest to end impunity for
the worst crimes under international law. Both strategies stem from the
historical reaction of the international community to the two world wars —
a reaction that led to the formation of the United Nations (as primary
embodiment of collective security) and the evolving system of international
criminal law. The latter involved the formation of various ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, so-called ‘mixed’ or ‘hybrid’ tribunals, and
ultimately the International Criminal Court.
The debate about the role of the Security Council in relation to the crime
of aggression is, it would seem, more about procedure than substantive
criminal law. The proposed art 8bis of the Rome Statute (on the deﬁnition of
aggression) should contain only the elements of the crime of aggression.
Additions to this article of essentially procedural (and political/institutional)
matters — such as, for instance, the role of the prosecutor vis-à-vis the
Security Council — would cloud the deﬁnition of aggression. This, in turn,
could affect the precision or clarity of meaning expected from a criminaliza-
tion provision. These institutional and procedural aspects are best dealt with
in a separate provision.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
War and lesser forms of aggression affect the stability of the international legal
and political order. Apart from these rather abstract-sounding interests that
are negatively affected by war, the reality is that aggression also affects the
lives of individuals. Collective security, one of the key features of the
international system, was developed to discourage the use of armed force in
ways not provided for in the principal international instruments, notably the
UN Charter.
The criminal-justice response to aggression is still underdeveloped. The
almost universal non-criminalization of aggression at national level (and the
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concomitant lack of prosecutions) must be understood in the light of
multiple constitutional, doctrinal and political reasons; and the process to
deﬁne aggression for purposes of the Rome Statute provides a very realistic
opportunity for states to reassess their views of and responses to aggression.
Rhetoric and the intricacies of diplomacy aside, the time seems ripe for a
realistic and effective regulation of individual criminal liability for the crime
of aggression to take shape.
As we have seen, art 5(2) of the Rome Statute prompted the Assembly of
States Parties to establish a special working group to draft a deﬁnition of
aggression and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court over the crime of aggression. Article 5(2) is structured on
both the criminal justice and collective security approaches to aggression. It
is argued here that, more than a ‘compromise text’, art 5(2) is indeed one of
the key pointers in the Rome Statute that reﬂects this multilateral treaty’s
constitutionalist traits. The developing system of international criminal law
thus contributes to an international system characterized by the limitation of
state power (and the unlawful use of armed force by states).
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